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ABSTRACT 
In recent past, there has been upward movement of bank frauds in Nigeria. For instance, the 
figure rose to N8 309.83billion in 2004 as against N 3399.39 billion in 1994 representing an 
increase of over 350%. This no doubt has lowered the confidence of the public and bank 
customers and hence the need for this research. The banking system is the medium through 
which funds flow into and out of the country. Some factors were identified as causes of fraud 
and illegitimate acquisition of wealth. This study empirically tested if there is no significant 
relationship between deposits on the one hand, and the following explanatory variables-fraud, 
actual/expected loss and MLA between 1989 – 2004. The Ordinary Least Square method 
(OLS) was employed in the study. Furthermore, correlation coefficient, t-test, F-test and the 
standard error were used in testing the relationship between the variables formulated in the 
hypotheses. From the four tests carried on the fitted regression model, three of them show that 
the regression is very useful in explaining variability in deposits.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The issues of banking frauds, thefts, defalcation and forgeries have assumed unprecedented 
proportions and dimensions in the banking industry. Fraud in the Nigerian Banking industry is 
endemic and intractable. Fraud has its root firmly entrenched in the social setting and the 
extent of growth depends on our wrong sense of value we choose to cultivate in terms of 
acquisition of wealth. Therefore, the high propensity to defraud of the average Nigerian is the 
direct product of our materialistic society. The banks are merely a reflection of the society in 
which they operate. Ogbu (2003:42) stated that frauds in Nigerian banks continued on the rise 
in 2002 with 77 banks of the 90 in operation recording cases involving the sum of N12.9 
billion. In 2001, the figure was 943 cases involving N11.2 billion. The NDIC report showed 
the actual loss to have exceeded the expected provisions for only N1.3 billion. Onyeogocha 
(2001:34) has attributed it to insider abuses and even board tussles. It was reported in NDIC 
1996/7 Annual report and Statement of Accounts that the number of frauds reached a 
magnitude of N1,006 million in 127 cases reported in commercial banks and 587 cases 
involving N1,543 million. Hur-Yagba (2003:82) in his finding posited that majority of cases 
of fraudulent activities are designed with all the pretence of a bonafide action that they can 
easily pass undetected.  
 
Aderibigbe (1999:12-13) in his study and findings on internal Audit functions and frauds 
opined that cashiers are the main perpetrators of frauds, closely followed by accounting clerks. 
The incidence of fraud perpetration by these categories of staff is much pronounced in the 
banking industry. The cumulative effect of all these is lost of public confidence in the banking 
industry and thus  it was reported by (This Day July 11, 2004:35) that currently we have about 
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N400 billion outside of the banking system waiting to be mobilized. With the reported cases 
of frauds in banks this becomes a herculean task. There are escalating cases of reported 
clearing frauds in the country. It is not an understatement to mention that with the clamp down 
by the police force of the Advance Fee Fraud otherwise known as „419‟, perpetrators of the 
fraud have focused their attention on the clearing system. 
Despite the action of the police, there is loss of customers, reduction in shareholders‟ fund as 
well as erosion of the bank‟s capital base and ultimately closure of some banks due to banks 
failures. 
 
 The revocation of license of Peak Merchant Bank limited in the first quarter of 2003 and 
Savannah Bank on 19
th
 February 2002 were due to shady deals. Ikpefan (2003:23) in his paper 
pointed out that in a bid to come out of distress, Peak Merchant Bank collected Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS) cheque totaling N1,086,144.33 billion cleared through three 
commercial banks and converted the proceeds. Frauds has not helped discontinuity of distress 
in banks globally but has led to the closures of some banks in other part of the world and this 
phenomenon need to be checked in Nigeria if she need to advance politically, economically, 
industrially among the comity of nations. It is against this backdrop that this paper attempts to 
look at the growth of banks frauds in the banking industry with (facts and figures), causes and 
prevention of bank frauds and the impact on the banking industry. Section 1 of this paper, 
therefore discusses problem statement, objective of study and scope of the study. Section 2 
focuses on theoretical framework/literature review. Section 3 contains the methodology and 
model specification while Section 4 dwells on data presentation and discussion of findings. 
The paper ends with conclusion and recommendation. 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
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In Nigeria today, fraud in the banking industry has been a topical issue not only to the 
shareholders, regulatory authorities but the public at large. This stem from the fact that 
frauds constitute a threat to the continued corporate existence of an organization. The 
growth of bank frauds over the years has constituted a problem. This is because all 
stakeholders, retirees, customers, present employee e.t.c rely on such system as a means 
of livelihold. Stemming the tide of bank frauds would go a long way in alleviating the 
economic hardship being experienced currently by these categories of citizens and would 
help again in reassuring the stakeholders and raising their confidence level in the system. 
This become pertinent now that the present policy thrust of CBN is on intermedediation 
of excess fund outside the banking system estimated at about N400 billion. The overall 
result would have positive impact on the stakeholders in respect of the recently concluded 
recapitalization by way of heightening their confidence in the banking system.  
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF STUDY 
    As stated earlier, there has been continued growth of frauds in the banking industry over the 
years, which has constituted a problem not only to shareholders, customers but to regulatory 
authorities and the general public. The purpose of this write-up is to conduct an empirical 
research into the growth of bank frauds, find out how much is involve, identify the causes, to 
test the impact of frauds on deposit mobilization, actual loss on insured banks and to proffer 
solutions especially now where many banks are facing distress which may ultimately lead to 
their closure. 
1.4        THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
    This study is limited to insured commercial and merchant banks in Nigeria. The 
     study covers the period 1989- 2004 and the data for the analysis is obtained from the 
NDIC. 
2.1   CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK/LITERATURE REVIEW 
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The concise oxford Dictionary of current English (1974:485) defined fraud as 
deceitfulness; criminal deception and use of false representations. Hur-Yagba (2003.83) 
opined that there is a general consensus among criminologists that fraud is caused by 
three elements called: Will, Opportunity, Exit (WOE) i.e. the will to commit frauds by the 
individual, the opportunity to execute the fraud and the exit which is the escape from 
sanctions against successful or attempted fraud or deviant behavior. According to Harrell 
cited in Financial Standard (2003:11) he argued that no matter what we do in life, if we 
have a positive attitude, we would always be 100 percent in all human endeavors. This is 
even evident in the numerical value of the word “Attitude”. We can check this by 
assigning value to each letter; A=1… Z=26 isn’t Attitude =100.Harell‟s work and 
experiences is from established psychological and behavioural research, for gaining 
control of our carrier. Gire (2005:4-5) posited that attitude tend to vary in strength-some 
being much stronger or weaker than others. The importance of determining the strength of 
an attitude lies in the fact that strong attitudes are presumed to be more difficult to 
change. People tend to hold attitudes only toward objects that exist in their psychological 
world. Chizea (1991:22) explained fraud as any premeditated act of criminal deceit, 
trickery or falsification by a person or group of persons with the intention of altering facts 
in order to obtain undue personal monetary advantage.  
He mentioned the following as typical manifestation of fraud: cash thefts from the tills of 
bank by staff, forgeries of a customer‟s signature, use of forged cheque to withdraw 
money from his account with the bank, unauthorized and illegal transfer of fund from a 
customer‟s account, opening and operating of fictitious (ghost) account for illegal 
transactions, lending to fictitious borrowers through fictitious account opened at a branch, 
suppression of cheque by disloyal staff, payment against unclear effects, granting loans 
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without adequate information and security from borrowers or lenders. The list is endless. 
In his contribution,  
Kolawole (2003:56) attributed cases of frauds in the banking system to unskilled 
employee who are not professionals; our legal system that prolong cases of fraud for too 
long making room for undue interference. Atijosan (1993:29) also stated that frauds could 
be carried out through addition of fictitious transactions, altering transactions through 
wrong posting of accounts and deleting transactions by omitting specific accounts. 
Archibong (1993:23) noted that the long-term survival and growth of any organization 
depends on how the issue of fraud and fraudulent practices in any organization is handled. 
Ojo (1997:80-83) stated that the current economic downturn, unstable political 
environment and fragile financial outlook in Nigeria require adequate preventive and 
control tools to manage the banks and other institutions and enterprises. The notable 
efforts made by the relevant authorities to strengthen bank regulatory framework are: (i) 
The Accounting Standards for Banks and Non-banks financial institutions (Part 1) issued 
by the Nigerian Accounting Standard Board (NASB), (ii) The Prudential guidelines for 
licensed banks issued by the Banking supervision Department of the CBN on 7
th
 
November, 1990, 
(iii) The adoption of International agreement on bank‟s capital adequacy or Basle Accord 
on capital adequacy. These measures were meant to stem the tide of bank failures by 
establishing standard policies to regulate banking business. Accountants, bank 
professionals through the audit and inspection unit could assist in putting in place and 
ensuring compliance with the required internal control systems and procedures to tackle 
the problem of frauds and related financial malpractices. Section 32 of the Nigerian 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) Act No.22 of 1988 (as amended) stipulated “any 
licensed bank or such other financial institution which insures its deposits with the 
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corporation shall be required to provide fidelity bond coverage”. The fidelity insurance 
insurance policy covers frauds and forgeries committed by staff of insured banks. The 
insurance policy is intended to reduce the adverse effect of insider frauds and forgeries on 
the banks. Therefore, it is expected that all insured banks be expected to take up fidelity 
insurance cover and renew it on annual basis. 
 From 2002 NDIC Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, the required minimum 
insurance coverage for each bank is fixed at 15% of its paid up capital as at  31
st
 
December of the preceding year. From the banks returns cited in NDIC Report (2002) 
only 74 representing 82.2% responded as against 90 banks existing in 2001 with only 
81who responded representing 90%. The return also showed that 55 insured banks, 
representing 61.1 percent of the total number of insured banks in operation had adequate 
cover in 2002 as compared to about 67.8% of insured banks in 2001, depicting a decrease 
of 6% points. Considering the unstable security environment in Nigeria replete with 
various dimensions of frauds, some banks are yet to take advantage of this safeguard to 
protest frauds and forgeries. It would be necessary for licensed banks to take fidelity 
insurance cover. It would not be farfetched to assert that the magnitude of bank frauds 
may have led to the drop in the overall balance of payments deficit and Gross Domestic 
Product from 10.20 percent in 1998 to 2.2 percent in 2003 (See CBN Annual Statement of 
Account 2003)  
 
GROWTH OF BANK FRAUDS 
Table 1 shows that there is a linear relationship between amount involved in fraud and deposit 
mobilize between (1989-2004)) for insured banks. This confirms the hypothesis in chapter 
three that fraud has a significant influence on deposit mobilization for insured banks. The 
actual loss does not commensurate with the amount of fraud between 1989-2004 while the 
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amount of fraud rose from N104,967m in 1989 to N12, 919.55b in 2002 and dropped slightly 
to N8,309.83b in 2004, amount of expected loss fluctuated between the period 1989-
2004.From N15.341mm in 1989 it dropped to N227.44m  in 1997 rose to N1094.55b  in 2000 
and then dropped to N854.46m  in 2003 and rose again to 1,804.45b in 2004.(See Table 4). 
The proportion of total expected loss corresponds to the actual loss for the period. From table 
3, out of a total number of 115 in 1994 only 40 had adequate coverage of their fund with 
NDIC leaving 75 uninsured banks unsafe in case of distress or outright closure of such banks. 
Because the spate of distress syndrome in the economy, the number of banks dropped to 89 
out of which only 49 were insured were insured and adequately covered. The rest 40 
uninsured banks were unsafe in case of distress or outright closure. Total number of reported 
cases of fraud rose from 170 to 850 in 2003.(See table 3 below). 
Table 2  that, there was a steady increase in profit between 1999 – 2002 except in 2003, when 
it dropped to 82.324m (11.67%) this also led to a drop in the net interest margin,  yield on 
earnings, returns on equity, returns on asset to 7.7%, 20.32%, 29.11%, and 2% respectively. 
The increase in bank fraud between (1989-2004) from table four does not show any linear 
relationship with profit before tax in table two while fraud dropped by 27.37% in 2003, profit 
before tax dropped marginally by only 11.67% in 2003.This also does not depict any linear 
relationship. The funding cost shows an increase between 1998-2003 in agreement with the 
increase in fraud in the same period except in 2003 when funding cost dropped by 26.20% 
almost at par with the decrease in fraud by 27.37%. Despite the increase in fraud, there is an 
overall increase in non-interest income during the period covered. It rose from 
N57,135million in 1998 to N162, 044m in 2003. 
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TABLE 1  BANK’S STAFF INVOLVED IN FRAUDS AND FORGERIES (EXTRACT) 
Rank 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 No % No % No % No % No % No % 
Supervisors 
&Managers 
112 
 
36.01 178 29.9 132 26.8 55 36.1 16 18.80 25 23.58 
Officers 
Accountant & 
Executive 
Assistance 
 
72 
 
23.15 
 
144 
 
24.2 
 
101 
 
20.5 
 
60 
 
39.42 
 
48 
 
56.50 
 
41 
 
38.68 
Clerks & 
Cashiers 
82 26.37 92 15.4 137 27.8 30 19.74 13 15.30 25 23.58 
Typists, 
Technicians & 
Stenographers 
 
12 
 
3.86 
 
37 
 
6.2 
 
20 
 
4.1 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Messengers, 
Drivers, 
Cleaners, 
Security, 
Guards & 
Stewards 
 
26 
 
8.36 
 
127 
 
21.3 
 
81 
 
16.4 
 
5 
 
3.29 
 
4 
 
4.70 
 
7 
 
6.60 
Temporary 
Staff 
5 1.61 15 2.5 8 1.6 2 1.32 4 4.70 8 7.55 
Uncategorised 
Staff 
2 0.64 3 0.5 14 2.8 - - - 4.70 - - 
Total  311 100 596 100 493 100 152 100 85 100 106 100 
 
TABLE  2 :EARNINGS  AND PROFITABILITY (EXTRACT) 
 
INDICATORS 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
N’000 
Profit before tax 
(N’000 
Not available 46,528 63,2266 95,124 93,203 82,324 
Net Interest 
Margin (%) 
11.16 10.73 9.12 11.55 10.47 7.71 
Yield on 
Earnings (%) 
17.55 4.64 4.62 27.37 27.55 20.32 
Funding Cost 
(%) 
8.09 9.42 9.47 11.37 13.05 9.63 
Return on 
Equity (%) 
86.08 80.59 99.45 114.29 41.63 29.11 
Return on Asset 
(%) 
4.42 4.13 3.96 4.82 2.63 2.00 
Non – interest - 57,135 85,418 111,968 121,233 162,044 
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Income (N’000) 
 
SOURCES:: NDIC ANNUAL REPORTS AND STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS (VARIOUS ISSUES)  
 
TABLE 3 : BANKS RESPONSE TO NDIC FIDELITY INSURANCE COVER (EXTRACT) 
 
Year No of 
Banks In 
Operation 
No of 
Banks that 
complied 
Total No 
of Fraud 
Cases 
Total 
Amount 
Involved 
(N’000) 
Actual 
Expected 
Loss 
(N’000) 
Proportion 
of Total 
Expected 
Loss to 
Amount 
Involved 
(%) 
No of 
Insured 
Banks with 
Adequate 
Cover. 
(C/M) 
1994 115 72 170 3399.39 950.65 27.97 40 
1995 115 73 147 1,011.36 229.13 22.66 42 
1996 115 84 606 1,600.68 375.243 23.44 64 
1997 115 68 487 3777.89 227.44 6.02 46 
1998 89 70 573 3197.91 692.25 21.66 51 
1999 90 54 195 73944.28 2730.06 36.87 34 
2000 89 14 403 2851.11 1094.55 37.9 14 
2001 90 81 943 11,243.94 906.3 8.06 61 
2002 90 74 796 12,919.55 1,299.69 10.06 55 
2003 89 56 850 9,838 854.46 9.13 49 
 
SOURCE: NDIC ANNUAL REPORT AND STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS. 
 
CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF BANK FRAUDS 
     The causes of fraud can be represented in a linear mathematical model:  
     ML = f (x) ……..equation (1) 
     Expressing this in a linearly econometric form, we have 
     ML= b0 + b1x1 + µ ………..equation (2) 
     Further expressing this in an explicit form, we have 
     ML = b0 + b1x1 + b2x2 + b3x3 + b4x4 + b5x5+b6x6 +b7x7 + b8x8 + b9x9 + µ  
     Where ML = Money Laundering 
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     b0 = Intercept 
            X1 = Lack of Experienced and adequate personnel 
            X2 = Internal Audit and Control 
            X3 = Inadequate Book Keeping/Accounting Procedure 
            X4 = Poor credit administration 
            X5= Inadequate job rotation/Segregation of duties 
             X6 = Ineffective bank Management 
             X7= Poor Knowledge of the Job/Clearing fraud 
              X8 = Delay Justice 
              X9= Moral decadence and Wrong value system/Society expectation 
               µ  = Stochastic disturbance term 
According to apriori expectations, b1,  b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8, b9 > 1 
                                                           b2  < 1 
It is important to note that the above model is specified in order to discuss the determinants of money 
laundering, not for a data analytical purpose. The causes of the factors leading to fraud activities are discussed 
below:      
 Chizea (1991) and Atijosan (1993) opined computers are used to perpetrate fraud and it is sometimes referred 
to as computer fraud. Computer fraud entails input manipulation, operations manipulation, and file 
manipulation, program manipulation e.t.c Bank frauds has assumed various dimensions. Employees sometimes 
who are reflection of the larger society assist in consummating bank frauds. Some of the causes of fraud are 
discussed below. By NDIC‟s (2004:39) analysis, seven commonest types of fraud and forgeries cases are 
presentation of forged cheque, granting of unauthorized loans, posting of fictitious credits, suppression of 
cash/cheques,fraudulent transfer and withdrawals, cheques and cash defalcation, loss of money to armed 
robbers and outright theft of money.  Some of the causes of fraud are discussed below: 
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(i) Lack of Experienced And Adequate Personnel 
  In view of rapid expansion in the banking industry in the mid „80‟s, provision was not made to train bankers 
to fill the missing gaps. This led to the dilution of standards and professionalism was thrown to the wind. 
Honesty and integrity, which are the hallmark of banking, took a secondary position. This is reflected in the 
lack of competent hands among the management cadres of liquidated and distress bank. The CBN and the 
Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria should assist to bridge the gap by assisting to train the required 
personnel for the banking industry. 
(ii) Internal Audit And Control 
    There is absence of internal auditing procedures to ensure compliance with standards. This has contributed 
to bank loses as a result of inefficiencies, inaccuracies, irregularities and willful manipulations There is the 
need to ensure that there exists an independent and competent internal audit or inspection unit. Systems of 
control must be put in place to safeguard assets, accuracy and reliability of the records. The need for an 
independent and competent internal audit or inspection unit becomes very relevant. 
(iii) Inadequate Book Keeping/Accounting Procedure 
     Improper bookkeeping record gives rise to an unhealthy meddlesomeness. This has led some accountant 
and auditors comprising „doctoring‟ or window dressing financial statements to present a rather distorting or 
misleading state of affairs of enterprises being serviced by colluding with bank management. There should be 
strong accounting controls and security measures, which are subject to periodic re-assessment for the 
continued good health of the organization. The supervisory control arm of the CBN should be strengthen to 
check inconsistent accounting policies and practices in banks. This would in the long run pave way for 
comparison of bank performance. 
(iv) Poor Credit Administration 
      This is the bane of many Nigerian banks. Many loans granted are not properly appraised. And this as 
resulted in an increase in volume of non-performing assets or bad debts putting many banks in precarious 
financial situations. Cases abound of unauthorized lending and lending to ghost borrowers. The Failed Bank 
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(Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Decree No. 18 1994 should be encourage and 
strengthened while the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) should operate as an independent 
unit of the government to enable it deal with cases of Advance Fee Fraud „419” whose transaction sometimes 
pass through bank. 
(v) Inadequate Job Rotation/ Segregation of Duties 
     Where a staff stays too long on one schedule, it provides an opportunity to commit and cover frauds. Also 
where schedules meant for different individuals are cumulated in one person, it gives an opportunity to also 
commit fraud. Bank management should avoid an individual with too much jobs by employing individuals to 
fill the gap. 
(vi) Ineffective Bank Management 
        Some of the top management staff lack knowledge of principles and practice of management such as 
planning, control, directing, coordination and supervision. Thus, they exhibit poor judgment and promote 
fraudulent behavior. Bank management requires training, retraining and re-orientation on values. 
(vii) Poor Knowledge of The Job 
      Some bank employees exhibit lack of knowledge of their duties and responsibilities and therefore easily 
fall prey to fraudsters. There is need for training and retraining of employees. 
 
(viii) Clearing Fraud 
      All parties in the clearing system such as drawer, presenting/collecting bank, and paying /drawee bank 
must comply with clearing guidelines. Clearing fraud is an unlawful conferment of financial or monetary 
benefit upon any person through the clearing system to which that person otherwise would not be entitled. 
These include presentation of spurious instruments on other banks that is fake or forged cheque; drawing 
instruments on unfounded accounts by a bank and/ or with the connivance of customers of the banks; issuance 
of bank drafts, manager cheque and bankers payments to other banks. When there is insufficient funds in the 
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bank account to accommodate the instrument; and wrong presentation of instruments of high value on other 
banks with fraudulent intent.  
To minimize the incidence of clearing fraud, there should be an enabling environment for employees to work. 
This implies clean environment, centralize waste disposal, good equipments such as good photocopies, air 
conditioners in good working order and adequate, employment of high calibre staff/officials assigned clearing 
duties with good track records, motivation of staff to avoid temptation, accountability of lines of authority 
must be clear and supervision and control are very essential in a clearing environment. 
(ix) Society Expectation 
    The unquestioning attitude towards who are involve in frauds/sudden wealth especially from bank staff that 
eagerly yearn to meet rising society expectation. There is the need by the larger society to change their value 
system by questioning source of all wealth. This measure would require government support. 
(x) Delay Justice 
   The lack of adequate capacity to detect, investigate and prosecute reported cases of fraud by the law 
enforcement agents. The judiciary is often slow in dispensing cases of fraud and the non-disclosure of frauds 
and lack of cooperation from the affected institutions because of the adverse publicity it brings to them 
encouraged bank employees to engage in frauds. 
(xi) Other Miscellaneous Issues 
    The list of frauds and forgeries in the banking industry is by no means exhaustive in this paper. However, it 
is pertinent to mention that bank staff need to comply with operational guidelines, code of conduct, while 
management need to be security conscious to protect their assets. Banks must render statements Account to 
their customers in order to resolve differences that are fraud suspect. Special Squad at the state and federal 
intelligence division of the Nigerian police should be trained and retrained to deal with cases of fraud. Staff 
dismissed in banks on account of fraud should be circularized to other banks to prevent re-employment. All 
bankers irrespective of their status should be registered with the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria so 
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that the institute can watch over their activities and can summon anyone to the disciplinary committee on 
account of fraud.  
3.1 METHODOLOGY AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
    This section seeks to highlight or spell out in detail the research design adopted in the entire study and to 
test the hypotheses formulated. The data collected for this study is historical (Secondary). 
      Test of Hypotheses 
(i) Ho: That there is no significant relationship between deposits before and fraud between 1989  
                     -2004.  
(ii) Ho: That there is no significant relation between deposits and actual loss between 1989 –  
                    2004. 
(iii) Ho: That there is no significant relationship between deposits and MLA between 1989 –  
                    2004. 
Model Specification 
 In an attempt to investigate the relationship between deposits on the one hand, fraud, actual and money 
laundering on the other hand, this study adopts a disequilibrum model which takes into account only the state of 
affairs of insured banks in Nigeria. In this dimension deposits mobilization for insured banks, is postulated as a 
function of fraud, actual loss and money laundering act. Therefore, the model specification is represented as: 
                          Y = a0 + a1F1+a2L2 + a3ML +  μ      …………Equation (1)  
 Where D = Deposit 
             F = Fraud 
             L = Actual /expected loss. 
 M = Money Laundering Act of 1995, being captured with a dummy. 
μ = Stochastic or disturbance term. 
The a priori expectations are stated mathematically below: 
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          ∂ D    <   0 
          ∂ F 
          ∂D   <    0 
          ∂L 
          ∂D   <    0 
           ∂ ML 
Measurement of Variable And Data Sources 
For the purpose of estimating equation 1, the least square method is used to ascertain the impact of bank fraud 
on deposit for insured banks (As shown in table 1). It is assumed in this study fraud has inhibited deposit 
mobilization in insured banks in Nigeria. This implies that there is a indirect relationship between frauds for 
insured banks and deposit mobilization and actual loss in a year. The figures for uninsured banks, though not 
reflected in the data are held constant. This would assist us to show the relationship between frauds, actual loss 
and deposit mobilization for insured banks. The sources of various secondary data used in this study are the 
Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC-various issues). These data covers the period 1989- 2004. 
4.1  DATA  PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
This section deals with analysis of data presented in the table below. It invoked the use of some techniques 
of analysis such as the multiple regression analysis of the ordinary least square (OLS) method, the 
coefficient of regression, coefficient of determination, the T-test statistics, F-test statistics and the Durbin-
Waston test..R
2
 represents the proportion of total variability in the observed value  that is explained by the 
multiple regression of deposits, fraud, actual loss and money laundering Act. Since R
2
 ≠  0, this implies that 
the model explains the variability  which suggests that fraud, actual loss and money laundering act are 
significantly related to deposits in their present linear form.                    
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Table 4: Summary of Insured bank’s Deposit, Fraud and Actual/Expected Loss                                                         
 
 
 SOURCE: NDIC ANNUAL REPORT AND STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS (VARIOUS ISSUES) 
 
In fact, using the second regression of the appendix in (table 3)  which is the version that we got when we 
corrected the regression (table 2)  for auto-correlation, the R
2
 =0.99.This implies that approximately 99% of the 
variability in the observed deposits is explained by fraud, actual loss and money laundering act on the other 
hand. Conversely, 1% of deposits variability is unexplainable by the fitted regression model. It is pertinent to 
note that the larger value of R
2
 is a good sign that fraud, actual loss and money laundering act are useful in 
explaining a considerable proportion of the variability in deposits.  
 
 
Year Y (Deposit) 
  N‟000m  
X (Fraud) 
N‟000m 
Actual/Expected Loss 
N‟000m 
1989 50,200 104,967.74 15,341 
1990 43,411.40 804,196.90 22,482.10 
1991 59,436.90 388,512.70 26,678.60 
1992 88,218 411.75 73.11 
1993 144,791.00 2,543.00 750.60 
1994 177,373.80 3,399.39 950.65 
1995 210,945.60 1,011.36 229.13 
1996 258,968.10 160,068.00 375.24 
1997 314,185.50 3,777.90 227.44 
1998 392,478.25 3,196.51 692.85 
1999 569,798.48 7,404.28 2,780.06 
2000 838,592.56 2,851.11 2780.06 
2001 1,017,195.72 11,243.94 906.30 
2002 1,226,624.12 12,919.55 1,299.69 
2003 1,415,785.85 9,383.67 857.46 
2004 1,321,204 8,309.83 1,804.45 
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TABLE 5: MAIN FINDINGS 
MAIN FINDINGS 
Dependent Variable: Deposit 
          
    Explanatory Variable Summary Statistics 
  Constant F L ML R
2
 DW F Stat. Adj R
2
 SSW 
  318534.9 -0.60398 -15.9084 225908.5           
  (3.1655) (0.06737) (1.3105) (1.2018) 0.99497 2.2299 49.4342 0.97484 1.14 
Std Error 100626.1 0.005907 12.1381 187979.8           
Prob. 0.008 0.513 0.215 0.253     0.02     
          
 *Indicates significant of 5% level.      
                  Note- Values are in Parenthesis 
Table 5 shows a summary of the regression model. However, we should not judge the adequacy of the fitted 
regression model solely on the R
2 .
This leads to the analysis of F-test of the multiple regression model utility. 
Given that: 
 H0: a1 = a2 = a3 = 0 (The deposit model is not useful) 
H1  : a1 ≠ 0           (The deposit model is useful)  
Test of significance F*= 49.43 
Rejection Region (RR): For = 0.05, we reject H0; since 0.05 > 0.02.The fitted regression model is strong enough 
to be used for prediction. Although the F-test indicates that the fraud, actual loss and money laundering act are 
useful explanatory variables in determining the amount of deposits, one should not conclude automatically that 
every independent variable in the model is individually useful as well. Thus, we test the hypotheses about the 
explanatory variables vis-à-vis the apriori expectation. It is important because the parameters of these 
arguments represent the additional contribution of the fraud, actual loss and money laundering act in accounting 
for changes in the amount of deposits, given the presence of the other independent variables in the model. With 
respect to the apriori expectations, all the independent variables conform correctly. In other words, the result of 
the regression model shows that fraud will have inverse effect on deposits; actual loss will have indirect impact 
on deposits; and the money laundering act will have direct and positive relationship with deposits. By 
implication, the higher the fraud cases, the lower the amount of deposits, the greater the amount of actual losses, 
the lower the amount of deposits, and the introduction of money laundering act will boost deposits considerably.  
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Given the standard errors of the fraud, actual loss and money laundering act, one can proceed to answer the 
question: which, if any, of these explanatory variables are unrelated to the amount of deposits? Our approach is 
to use the information in the sample estimator, ai. to test the null hypothesis that ai = 0.Accepting the null 
hypothesis suggests that either fraud, actual loss or money laundering act  has no additional predictive value and 
therefore could be deleted from the fitted regression model. However, in this analysis, the rule of thumb adopted 
is that if a1 is less than one standard error away from 0, we conclude that the independent variable is not a 
significant predictor of the amount of deposits in the presence of the other two explanatory variables. By 
implication, from the result of the regression, the sample estimator of fraud is 0.0039795, which is less than 
one. This means that the inclusion of fraud in the fitted regression model is not a significant predictor of 
deposits in the presence of actual loss and money laundering act. 
 
 Furthermore, the result of our regression analysis shows that a unit decrease in actual loss will stimulate 
deposits by 15 million, holding fraud and money laundering act constant. Also, a unit increase in money 
laundering act will boost deposits by 225,908 million units holding fraud and actual loss constant. This leads us 
to the conclusion that actual loss and money laundering act are vital and significant factors in determining 
deposits.  
 
Using the t-test for individual ai; 
H0: ai = 0 (that is, each of the independent variable is unrelated to deposits, given the presence of the other 
explanatory variables in the model. 
Hi: ai ≠  0  ( that is, each of the independent variables is related to deposits, given the presence of the other 
independent variable in the model).Since the t1 are  smaller than the tabular value of t = 2.160 at the 5% level 
(two –tail test) and with 13df, we conclude that ai are  not statistically significant at the 5% level (that is, we 
cannot reject H0, that a0 = 0) 
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Out of four tests carried out on the fitted regression model, three of them show that the regression is very useful 
result in explaining variability in deposits. More importantly, it has been proved that money laundering act has a 
positive impact on the amount of deposits in Nigeria. In fact the money laundering act has boosted the post-
1995 deposits in Nigeria. 
 
5.1    CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
  The boards of the insured banks had apparently failed to institute appropriate controls and sound management 
information systems for all facets of their banks operations; and this has contributed to rampant cases of fraud in 
insured banks. Some of the chief executives were known to have thrived in unethical and unprofessional 
conducts. Lending by management of amounts that were by far in excess of authorized limits, without the 
knowledge and concurrence of the board. Facts before the NDIC, the police, and the Decree 18 Tribunal 
revealed that massive frauds were perpetrated in all the failed and distressed banks. For example, a former 
Managing Director of Gamji Bank gave cash and properties worth over N103million, while he was being tried 
for stealing  N57 million. According to THISDAY (2003:25) Investigation conducted by NDIC and accepted by 
CBN, revealed that the former managing director perpetrated fraud worth N1,086,438.33billon belonging to 
Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS). 
From the hypotheses tested, the study shows that deposits of insured banks have significant influence on the 
explanatory variables for the period 1989 -2004. We, therefore, recommend that bank mananagement should 
strengthen their internal control system; employ qualified personnel to work in it. This would to a large extent 
help to rebuild the public confidence in the banking industry. The N25 billion recapitalization will no doubt 
heighten the confidence of stakeholders in the Nigerian banking industry and if fraud is shunned it will also help 
in mobilizing the over N400 million outside the banking system. Leaders who occupy position always want to 
leave up to societal expectation of acquiring wealth illegally. For instance, the Money Laundering Act cannot 
succeed without attacking our wrong societal values. Ill-gotten wealth by individuals should be questioned so as 
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to reduce the tendency to acquire wealth at all cost. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
should be given all necessary support in arresting all forms of financial crimes in the society. This means that 
individuals (Nigerians) should willingly submit names of suspected individuals to the commission. 
Going back to Harrell‟s analysis, fraudsters should take control of their destiny in their hands. They should shun 
financial crimes, understand the power of attitude, take control of their life, reframe from bad attitude, find the 
purpose of their existence, motivate themselves for positive work that would shape their destiny, see change as 
an opportunity and leave a lasting legacy on this planet. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 2.Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is D 
 16 observations used for estimation from 1989 to 2004 
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 INT                       99219.7           201950.0             .49131[.632] 
 F                         .025433            .037276             .68230[.508] 
 L                         -1.2768            14.1574           -.090185[.930] 
 ML                       629942.5           234315.6             2.6884[.020] 
******************************************************************************* 
 R-Squared                     .47545   R-Bar-Squared                   .34431 
 S.E. of Regression          397761.5   F-stat.    F(  3,  12)    3.6256[.045] 
 Mean of Dependent Variable  508075.6   S.D. of Dependent Variable    491218.8 
 Residual Sum of Squares     1.90E+12   Equation Log-likelihood      -226.6993 
 Akaike Info. Criterion     -230.6993   Schwarz Bayesian Criterion   -232.2445 
 DW-statistic                  .41013 
******************************************************************************* 
                               Diagnostic Tests 
******************************************************************************* 
*    Test Statistics *        LM Version        *         F Version          * 
******************************************************************************* 
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ(   1)=  10.0413[.002]*F(   1,  11)=  18.5366[.001]* 
*                     *                          *                            * 
* B:Functional Form   *CHSQ(   1)= .0053599[.942]*F(   1,  11)= .0036862[.953]* 
*                     *                          *                            * 
* C:Normality         *CHSQ(   2)=   .71633[.699]*       Not applicable       * 
*                     *                          *                            * 
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ(   1)=   2.9603[.085]*F(   1,  14)=   3.1783[.096]* 
******************************************************************************* 
   A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
   B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
   C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
   D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
   Cochrane-Orcutt Method AR(2) converged after 20 iterations 
******************************************************************************* 
Table 3. Cochrane-Orcutt Method AR(5) converged after 54 iterations 
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is D 
 16 observations used for estimation from 1989 to 2004 
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 INT                      318534.9           100626.1             3.1655[.008] 
 F                       -.0039795           .0059067            -.67372[.513] 
 L                        -15.9074            12.1381            -1.3105[.215] 
 ML                       225908.5           187979.8             1.2018[.253] 
******************************************************************************* 
 R-Squared                     .99497   R-Bar-Squared                   .97484 
 S.E. of Regression           75445.4   F-stat.    F(  8,   2)   49.4342[.020] 
 Mean of Dependent Variable  508075.6   S.D. of Dependent Variable    491218.8 
 Residual Sum of Squares     1.14E+10   Equation Log-likelihood      -129.7750 
 Akaike Info. Criterion     -138.7750   Schwarz Bayesian Criterion   -142.2517 
 DW-statistic                  2.2299 
******************************************************************************* 
 
             Parameters of the Autoregressive Error Specification 
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